Though the question of the piety i s purely theoretical for me this is one of my most favorite dialogs thanks to the neat snares put by Socrates I admire to see Euthyphro falling into. \n Soc. Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of much consequence. For a man may be thought wise; but the Athenians, I suspect, do not much trouble themselves about him until he begins to impart his wisdom to others, and then for some reason or other, perhaps, as you say, from jealousy, they are angry \n\n Ἀθηναίοις γάρ τοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ σφόδρα μέλει ἄν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὑτοῦ σοφίας: ὃν δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἄλλους οἴωνται\n \n in other sources they give q uite a different translation - instead of “to impart his wisdom to others” it's “make others similar to him” and it makes the huge difference. When there is a risk of your kids growing into a queer philosophers, whatever wise they could be, the malicious mentor hardly can b e excused by any parent. quite Soc. We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods. \n \n \n I guess it's the gist of the whole story. Soc. And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible because it is seen ; nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you not agree? \n\n\n at least in some cases a thing should be both 'visible' and seen Soc. That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when I asked whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the just; and whether there may not be justice where there is not piety; for justice is the more extended notion of which piety is only a part. Do you dissent? \n \n \n But it means that justice can be impious? it's exactly the what Socrates is hinting at. The trick is in dealing with social or ethical notions like with set in mathematics. Or rather in trying to coax interlocutor into thinking it's a plausible approach.